M/S Estonia

M/S Estonia

A background

Robert Barestrand knows who murdered Olof Palme, and how it went down. But during the research process, it also turned out that he had information of what happened to M/S Estonia. On this page, we publicize the text about the happening, written by one of Roberts’ colleagues.

Scale model of M/S Estonia from the maritime museum, Tallinn. Photo credits: Wikipedia.

Prelude
As citizens of recognised democracies it is hard to grasp that leaders of such nations would resort to unconventional measures to, as will be shown, present a fabricated explanation to a disaster that affected thousands of people directly and, therefore, indirectly thousands upon thousands in the aftermath. Questions arose immediately what could have caused the catastrophic sinking. And, furthermore, why the initial answers never convinced those who looked deeper into the fatality. The aforementioned were also in several cases shunned and ostracised, paving the way for an acceptable explanation. As will be shown further on this acceptable explanation is severely flawed in several instances.

The Initial Reactions
The then outgoing prime minister of Sweden, Carl Bildt, announced on the following morning that the root cause of the sinking was the failure of the bow visor. A bold proclamation from somebody who had probably never even seen one in action in real life. Surviving third engineer on duty, Margus Treu, on the other hand, proclaimed that there was “water up to our knees in the engine room”. And, furthermore, he gave an even more important statement; “the bilge pumps were running”. This has been completely neglected by the official investigation. These statements, as will be explained further on, are incompatible with the official narrative.

The J.A.I.C.
The Joint Accident Investigating Commission was erected to work broadly and internationally. In all senses it failed. Even minor or close call incidents always result in a trial in court, commonly referred to as “Sea Trials”. But a disaster of unheard magnitude does not, this according to the logic of the J.A.I.C. This is unique in the history of shipping, there are no known accidents at sea that have not ended up in a court of law. Furthermore, as will be shown, the J.A.I.C. neglected to perform interrogations based on the rule of law. Very few properly conducted interrogations are available, except those emanating from the Estonian side who directly decided to treat the case as a criminal investigation.

The Myths
Several easily falsified myths were quickly established to support the official narrative. Of course this indeed immediately should have raised concerns and alarm, as clear warning signs that something out of the ordinary was going on. The rapid spreading of the myths mainly via the media contributed to derailing any dispassionate discussion and analysis.

Harsh Weather
The average wind speed at the time of the casualty was approximately 17 m/s. That is in no way to be considered as extreme or constitute speculations off irresponsible handling of the vessel. It was during the aftermath that harsh winds started to occur, during the rescue operations the average wind speed rose to around 21 m/s. When the actual casualty happened, the weather and hight of the waves can be considered usual, slight to medium, rough conditions. Nothing significant in relation to the vessel itself and the effect on it can be derived from the weather conditions.

Classification Society
One of the most ridiculous ideas brought forward is that the vessel was not cleared for its route and therefore was operated in breach of imagined restrictions. And what is worse, as even “experts” proclaim, is the reason for the disaster. The M/V Viking Sally, later renamed M/V Estonia, was built and completed in Mayer Werft, West Germany, in the year of 1979. There exists no documentation that the ferries route should be restricted. The construction was similar or identical to that of all then currently operating ferries in the Baltic Sea, regardless of route. In particular Viking Line had the habit of rearranging its vessels routes. By that it is highly unlikely there ever was any restriction imposed in the first place, nevertheless applied for. These speculations can simply be put down to ignorance in combination with a desire to satisfy the yearning public, as well as striving to portrait the vessel as unseaworthy.

Handling of the Vessel
Another famous myth is that the crew on the bridge were retaining a speed of the vessel not suitable for the weather conditions. Here once again complete ignorance surfaces. At the time of the casualty, as has already been shown, the weather conditions were not exceptionally harsh, thus any reduction of speed would have lacked any purpose. Since no grounds existed for a reduction in speed it was not even to be considered under the circumstances prevailing at the time.

Supposed Incompetence
This appalling attack on the crew of the M/V Estonia can easily be dismissed by statements from surveyors of the M/V Estonia. During a large scale drill, including external operators, it was noted, by the surveying authority, that the crew performed very well in all aspects. The crew therefor could be assessed as duly competent. There are no reasons to doubt this according to what is known from official documentation. Thus this is merely another falsehood presented to support the official narrative and is easily unveiled.

The Casualty and Survivors Testimonies
What can be extracted from survivors testimonies gives a delineation of the chain of events culminating in the final sinking of the vessel. Moreover, testimonies that strongly contradict the official version appear and are abundant. There are two things to consider regarding the process of the vessels sinking. Firstly, and most importantly, the behaviour of the vessel when the chain of events were initiated. And secondly, how testimonies from survivors can be put in relation to this.

A Flooded Car Deck and Related Consequences Thereof
In simple terms a flooded car deck causes the effected vessel to tilt over relatively rapidly, decreasing the chance of survival significantly for passengers and crew, especially for those residing further down in the vessel. On the M/V Estonia there were cabin compartments for passengers below the car deck, i.e. deck 1. This is essential in relation to the casualty due to the fact that 21 passengers living in these quarters survived. Out of a total 137 survivors there were thus 21 living below the car deck. Thus it can be concluded that survivors from deck number one are overrepresented among the survivors.

The Big Heel
The chain of events were initiated when a significant and massive heel occurred abruptly and threw passengers and crew members alike out of beds, into walls, furniture and other objects. Whereas the majority of passengers and off-duty crew became aware that something was not right in conjunction with this, the passengers on deck one seem to have been aware of troubles before the big heel. Testimonies from these survivors also indicate that two uniformed crew members had made their way down to deck one, and overheard that they were reporting water on deck one via radio. This was all before the big heel. Thus a vast deviation can be noted in regards to the official version of events.

Summary of Testimonies by Survivors from Deck One
Several passengers on deck one reported hearing and seeing flushing water in the corridors and also entering their cabins. This was obviously a cause of concern and the mentioned passengers started making their way upward. It can be concluded there was water on deck one, in significant quantities, prior to the big heel. In addition, what furthermore was reported from the aforementioned passengers, was the uprighting of the vessel after the initial violent heel. According to several of them the vessel uprighted itself to a position of almost even keel. It was during this timeframe the possibility to flee to safety emerged. Further testimonies depict how the vessel then slowly tilted back to starboard and subsequently the course of sinking was then slowly initiated. As can be easily concluded this is totally incompatible with a flooded car deck that would have caused an almost instantaneous catastrophic tilting of the vessel, with no possibility of any uprighting whatsoever.

Stability and a Damaged Hull
The M/V Estonia had three compartments beneath the waterline, i.e. the double bottom, the engine room and storage spaces and the passenger compartments. Flooding of the passenger compartments directly from the outside can not be ruled out, though no such observations exist, except for those of streaming water in large amounts. That which remains more likely is thus damage to the hull further beneath and/ or tanks in conjunction with the passenger compartments. Catastrophic flooding of a compartment in the double bottom and/or engine compartment would have without a doubt caused an abrupt big heel. But what about the reported uprighting? As water floods the lower compartments it at the same time causes a lowering of the centre off gravity. This will initially cause an uprighting of the vessel as the down flooding water makes its way through the lower parts of the hull. But, at the same time the vessels buoyancy slowly depletes, causing a reoccurring slow tilt back from the gained upright position. The vessel is then lost.

The Big Heel and the Engine Room Crew
Here perhaps the strongest evidence lays that a flooded car deck was not the root cause of the fatality, this in combination with testimonies from survivors living on deck one Hannes Kadak is already in full panic due to the big heel that occurred suddenly, shutting down the engines due to low oil pressure. Marcus Treu thereafter sends Kadak and Henrik Sillaste to the emergency escape routes via the funnel. Treu himself remained in the Engine Control Room and performed bilge pumping. These statements were subsequently removed from later interrogations. The reason for Treu omitting those events in subsequent interrogations is unknown, but for sure his initial statements contradict the official description of the chain of events.

Consequences of the Statements
Since it is not possible to pump water from the car deck, or deck 1 for that matter, Treu must have initiated pumping from deck 0. This appears to be shortly before Sillaste and Kadak fled through the funnel emergency escape route. And most notable, Kadak and Sillaste fled while the forward ramp was closed, according to their own testimonies. This is direct evidence that the flooded car deck is a complete falsehood. And, as shown, in conjunction with testimonies from deck 1 survivors, everything points to a catastrophic hole in the hull beneath the water line.